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Between citizenship and human rights 
Kate Nash 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the effects of the legalisation of international human rights on 
citizens and non-citizens within states.  Adopting a sociological approach to rights it 
becomes clear that, even in Europe, the cosmopolitanisation of law is not necessarily 
resulting in greater equality and justice.  In fact, 'actually existing' cosmopolitan 
citizenship is characterised by a proliferation of status groups that concretise new 
forms of inequality, including those of super-citizens, marginal citizens, quasi-
citizens, sub-citizens and un-citizens.  Far from inaugurating a new era of genuinely 
universal human rights, in some cases cosmopolitan law may even contribute to the 
creation of conditions in which fundamental human rights are violated. 
 
Keywords: nationalism; post-national citizenship; cosmopolitan law; migration; 
Europe; US 
 
Citizenship can be described in different ways according to the emphasis that is given 
to its various elements.  As liberals see it, citizenship is a legal status based on 
nationality that is conferred by a state at birth or through naturalisation and which also 
confers specific rights and responsibilities in relation to that state (Marshall 1992).  In 
more republican terms, citizenship enables opportunities for political participation by 
means of formal procedures of voting, lobbying and standing for office or in more 
spontaneous ‘acts of citizenship’ and political mobilisations in civil society (Isin 2008).  
In any case citizenship also involves identity.  Citizens belong to a bounded and 
exclusive political community with a shared history and prospective future.  For the last 
two hundred years, the basis of the common bond between citizens has been assumed to 
be the nation: citizenship is experienced through belonging to a national community 
with shared memories, values and purposes.  The individual not only gains entitlements 
as a citizen; she or he (usually in different ways) is also prepared to make sacrifices to 
the community to which s/he feels her/himself to belong (Calhoun 2007).   
 
The close relationship between citizenship and nation has recently come under a good 
deal of scrutiny (eg Habermas 2001; Calhoun 2007; Kostakoupoulou 2008).  Processes 
and discourses of globalization mean that questions of political participation which are 
framed in terms of the interests and values of citizens within separate and distinct 
nation-states are inappropriate where issues and events are not contained within 
national territories (Held 1995; Fraser 2005).  At the same time large-scale migration 
and settlement in states which were previously assumed to be made up of citizens with 
a relatively homogeneous racial and cultural background has also called the 
exclusionary basis of national political community into question.  Especially where 
minorities are resident over a long period, privileging a particular category of persons 
as citizens within a political community because of their skin colour and ethnicity is 
unjust.  Do these processes of globalisation, migration and settlement mean that 
citizenship status, rights and identity are now becoming irrelevant?  Or is citizenship 
itself being altered to meet the new times? 
 
One of the most important aspects of globalisation is the development of human rights.  
Human rights and citizenship have long been closely entwined; indeed historically they 
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share similar roots in liberal individualism.  This is clearly expressed in the great 
eighteenth century declarations of the ‘rights of man’, the American and the French, 
which, having resoundingly called for the recognition that ‘all men are created equal’, 
born with inalienable natural rights, then go on to make it quite clear that by ‘man’ they 
mean a citizen of the national state (1).  Modern states are explicitly legitimated in 
particularistic terms as democratically serving the national community of citizens 
whilst they are at the same time committed to upholding principles of universal rights.  
However, until relatively recently it was only political philosophers who remarked and 
reflected upon this paradox.   
 
In a number of rich and thought-provoking texts, Seyla Benhabib has developed the 
argument that citizenship itself is now becoming cosmopolitan through developments 
in human rights, especially within Europe.  Widespread and long-term trends of 
migration make this necessary: it is unjust that certain groups within a political 
community should be systematically treated as inferior to others on the basis of national 
origin (Benhabib 2004, 2007, 2008).  But Benhabib argues that citizenship is actually 
now becoming cosmopolitan because universal human rights are no longer just moral 
norms; they are developing into positive law that is binding on states, especially in 
relation to legal and illegal immigrants.  This development of human rights takes place 
primarily through international treaties between states, and as such it is potentially in 
tension with the principle of democratic self-determination that governs existing 
understandings of citizenship.  Ulrich Beck, for example, argues that the human rights 
regime is self-legitimating: based not on popular consent but on the exercise of reason, 
human rights do not therefore need democratic deliberation and decision-making (Beck 
2006: 297).  Benhabib argues, however, that this tension is more imagined than real as 
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what she calls the ‘democratic iteration’ of cosmopolitan norms of human rights within 
democratic societies alters national law in conformity with universal principles of 
international human rights.  According to Benhabib democratic iterations involve: 
[C]omplex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through 
which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and 
contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout legal 
and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society.  
Democratic iterations can take place in the “strong” public bodies of 
legislatives, the judiciary and the executive, as well as in the informal and 
“weak” publics of civil society associations and the media (Benhabib 2007: 
31).   
 
According to Benhabib, through their articulation in state and civil society democratic 
iterations of human rights thus create a cosmopolitan political community which finds 
itself to be ‘not only the subject but also the author of the laws’ and which includes 
both citizens and non-citizens (Benhabib 2007: 32).  Citizenship is being 
‘cosmopolitanised’: justice requires that rights should be extended to non-citizens 
who are resident within particular political communities, and this is happening, at 
least in Europe, with the democratic approval of the members of that community, 
citizens and non-citizens alike.    
 
Benhabib’s arguments are stimulating because of the way she addresses not just the 
age-old problem of the relationship between universalism and particularism in political 
theory, but also the fact that this relationship is now changing because of the 
development of universal human rights within states.  Human rights no longer concern 
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only distant others in far off countries; they are now part of everyday political life 
which citizens and non-citizens negotiate within existing political communities.  It is 
only to be expected, however, that as a political theorist, Benhabib develops her 
argument at a high level of abstraction.  And it is only this level of abstraction that 
enables her to assume, as she does, that ‘iterations’ of human rights are actually 
democratic: that there is progress towards the acceptance of international human rights 
agreements within states and that this is contributing to cosmopolitan justice by 
equalising the distribution of rights and responsibilities across groups within political 
communities.  From a sociological perspective, however, what is important is to study 
how the development of international human rights within states is impacting on the 
relationship between citizens and non-citizens in practice.  Is citizenship becoming 
cosmopolitanised by human rights?  Is there progress towards the equalisation of rights 
between citizens and non-citizens?  Or, as we might suspect, is the picture that is 
emerging a good deal more complex than Benhabib’s optimistic theory would suggest?   
 
From a sociological perspective the enjoyment of rights is never simply a matter of 
legal entitlement; it also depends on social structures through which power, material 
resources and meanings are created and circulated.  To explore the relationship 
between citizenship and human rights, David Lockwood’s work on civic stratification 
is a useful starting point (see Morris 2006).  Lockwood argues that the actual 
enjoyment of rights depends on two interlinked axes of inequality: the presence or 
absence of legal, bureaucratic rights; and the possession of moral or material 
resources, which generally operate informally.  The interplay of the two axes of legal 
entitlement and material and moral resources means that, far from abolishing gross 
injustice in the treatment of both citizens and non-citizens, the use of human rights is 
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actually contributing to the institutionalisation of new and very complex inequalities.  
Legal claims that human rights activists intend to ‘cosmopolitanise’ states are actually 
tending to produce new types of formally and substantively unequal status.  Indeed, in 
some cases securing human rights may even put people in positions in which they 
then find themselves subjected to further violations of their fundamental human 
rights.   
 
In the following section we first consider how human rights have become legalised.  
Although in legal doctrine there is still an absolute dichotomy between national and 
international law, there is increasingly, as Benhabib argues, a ‘collusion and 
confluence’ between them in practice (Benhabib 2008: 27).  As a result we are seeing 
the emergence of cosmopolitan law oriented towards the ideal of abolishing the 
distinction between the rights of citizens and those of non-citizens on which modern 
states were founded.  In practice, however, cosmopolitan law contributes rather to the 
complication of citizenship as a rights-bearing status, to the concretization of new 
forms of inequality between citizens and non-citizens, and even to violations of 
human rights as such.  The second section of the article analyses the paradoxical and 
unintended outcome of human rights advocacy in terms of a proliferation of 
citizenship statuses which deconstruct any absolute distinction between citizens and 
non-citizens, but which do not thereby inaugurate a new era of genuinely universal 
human rights.  Finally, the concluding section considers that, if this is ‘actually 
existing’ cosmopolitan citizenship, it is as important to be aware of its inequalities, 
paradoxes and lacunae as it is to be optimistic about the progressive possibilities of 
globalisation and human rights.   
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Cosmopolitan law of human rights 
Human rights are becoming increasingly legalised.  Although couched in legalistic 
language, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was no more than a proclamation 
of the moral principles which should govern the activities of states with regard to 
individuals under their jurisdiction.  Since then, however, international human rights 
agreements have become much more detailed and specific; they have been signed and 
ratified as obliging states to comply with their specifications; and they generally 
delegate interpretation, monitoring and implementation of those agreements to a third 
party (Abbott et al. 2001: 3).  We can understand international human rights agreements 
as on a continuum from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ law according to the degree of legalisation they 
encode.  Most significant in terms of ‘hard’ law are those which delegate authority to 
courts for their implementation.  In such cases human rights become positive law rather 
than just universal moral principles or political aspirations.   
 
The legalisation of human rights transforms international law.  Since the end of World 
War Two, international law has no longer been concerned solely with relations 
between states.  Two major changes in international law came together then which 
altered it significantly.  Firstly, individuals became criminally accountable for 
violations of the laws of war (‘just obeying orders’ was no longer a legitimate legal 
defence, however lowly a position the accused held in the military or state hierarchy).  
Secondly, principles of human rights began to be developed which prescribed limits 
to a government’s conduct towards its own citizens, to apply in times of peace as well 
as war (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 4; see also Held 1995: 101-2).  This second 
principle was carried forward and extended with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the subsequent 
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international human rights law that was based on it, individuals have human rights, 
and also the responsibility to uphold human rights, regardless of citizenship status.  
As Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has it: 
‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status…’ 
 
However, with the partial exception of the European system of human rights, the 
balance of powers until the end of the Cold War meant that international law 
effectively maintained classic state sovereignty, being overwhelmingly concerned 
with keeping the peace between states (Held 2002).  It is only since the Cold War that 
we are now seeing the beginning of cosmopolitan law, building on the ‘Nuremberg 
principles to reach inside states and enforcing claims against human rights violators 
(see Held 2002; Hirsh 2003).  The aim of human rights activists and legal innovators 
who support and extend cosmopolitan law is that each and every individual should 
become legally responsible for the rights of each and every other individual, 
regardless of their nationality and citizenship status.   
 
Cosmopolitan law is differentially institutionalised across the world.  The 
cosmopolitan law of human rights is especially well developed in Europe, with the 
European Court of Human Rights effectively acting as a ‘constitutional court for civil 
and political rights’ for all the member states of the Council of Europe (Buregnthal et 
al. 2002: 172).  Both citizens and non-citizens have the right to bring cases to the 
European Court if they believe their human rights have been violated, though the 
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Court only has powers to recommend to a state that it finds in violation of human 
rights that it should make new legislation.  In addition, however, states, have bound 
themselves to observe the European Convention on Human Rights, and in many cases 
it is now part of national law.  In ‘monist’ member states of the Council of Europe the 
European Convention of Human Rights is automatically the standard against which 
national law is judged; in ‘dualist’ states it may be made so by the national legislature 
(Smith 2007: 227-9).  In the UK, for example, a dualist state, the Human Rights Act 
1998 incorporated the European Convention into national law, which means that 
public authorities are now bound to act with respect for human rights, including 
judges who interpret domestic law and ministers passing legislation in government 
(Klug 2000). 
 
The cosmopolitanisation of Europe is all the more striking when it is contrasted, as it 
often is, to the ‘unilateral reassertion of sovereignty’ of the US state (Benhabib 2007: 
28).  There are undoubtedly differences between the US and Europe in the way in 
which human rights have been legalised within these states.  Most notably, for the 
most part only weak references to human rights law are possible in US courts (ie for 
persuasive effect, without drawing on codified US law).  International treaties are not 
self-executing in the dualist legal system of the US.  In order to become US law they 
must not only be signed and ratified with other contracting states, but also passed as 
legislation by Congress.  Congress has not passed legislation to make the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the civil and political rights listed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, into domestic law.  In addition, the US is one 
of the few states in the world that has not ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which lists in detail the social and economic 
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rights that make up over half the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  It is not 
just, then, that the Bush Administration has been particularly opposed to the 
interference of the international community in US foreign and domestic affairs 
(whilst, of course, using the rhetoric of human rights to justify military aggression in 
Afghanistan and Iraq); resistance to the cosmopolitanisation of international law has 
been well-established for a much longer period in the political culture of the US 
(Ignatieff 2005).   
 
It is important to note, however, that although human rights law is much more 
institutionalised in Europe than it is in the US, it is still very unevenly applied in 
Europe too.  This is especially notable where issues of immigration and security tempt 
political authorities into sacrificing the rights of unpopular minorities - precisely those 
groups who are most in need of human rights.  In fact, analysing the relationship 
between citizenship and human rights in Europe and the US, what is most striking in 
both cases is a proliferation of statuses produced out of the interplay of citizenship 
and human rights.  The distinction between citizens and non-citizens is not abolished 
in this proliferation of citizenship statuses, but it does become far more complex.  
 
Citizens and mere humans 
The complexity of the relationship between citizenship and non-citizenship can be 
analysed in terms of what I will call ‘actually existing’ cosmopolitan citizenship.  
‘Actually existing’ cosmopolitan citizenship is characterised by a proliferation of 
status groups.  The members of each group enjoy a different package of formal and 
substantive rights according to their situation as citizens or non-citizens, the way in 
which states administer human rights, and their access to material and moral resources 
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within that state.  An analysis of different types of status produced with respect to the 
relationship between citizenship and human rights in cosmopolitan citizenship would 
have to include at least the following five distinctions: super-citizens, marginal 
citizens, quasi-citizens, sub-citizens and un-citizens.   
 
Super-citizens 
Firstly, within the legal status of ‘full citizenship’ there is a marked difference between 
what we might call ‘super-citizens’ and ‘marginal citizens’ in relation to human rights.  
Super-citizens have all the rights of citizens but increasingly, in a globalising, de-
regulated political economy, citizenship does not tie them to states because they own 
the means of production or are in possession of secure employment or marketable skills 
which enable mobility across borders.  Super-citizens are those Craig Calhoun calls 
‘frequent flier’ elite cosmopolitans (Calhoun 2003).   
 
This group has very little material interest as a group in human rights except insofar as 
human rights policies may succeed in making the world generally more stable and 
profitable.  Their protected mobility comes from their citizenship status as well as from 
their wealth and/or skills.  When faced with unstable or dangerous political conditions, 
super-citizens are more likely to fly home or to appeal to the authorities of the states to 
which they belong to intervene on their behalf than they are to claim human rights.  On 
the other hand, they may be more likely to identify with cosmopolitanism and human 
rights than other people.  Super-citizens may be involved in the extension of human 
rights as professionals – especially as lawyers, leaders of International Non-
Governmental Organisations, or researchers – though they would not generally expect 
to see themselves as the subjects of human rights claims.  With a cool detachment from 
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de-moded nationalist fervour, they may also be more likely than others to celebrate 
specifically cosmopolitan virtues, including the adherence to principles of individual 
human rights (Turner 2002).  
 
Marginal citizens 
Super-citizens may be compared with a second status group, ‘marginal citizens’.  
Marginality is conferred in two main ways on citizens who have full citizenship rights 
but who nevertheless do not enjoy full citizenship status: economically, by relative 
poverty; and socially, by racism.   
 
Firstly, in terms of economic capacities marginal citizens are those who either do not 
have paid work, or who have insecure, low paid or partial participation in the labour 
market.  This group enjoys citizenship rights to a variable degree according to different 
dimensions of inequality and subordination.  Marginality in this sense is not, of course, 
new, but it is clear that the social and economic benefits of citizenship are under attack 
as the regulation of capitalism is altered through globalisation (see Turner 2001).   
 
Although the growth of the global human rights regime is also an aspect of 
globalisation, in terms of deteriorating social citizenship, human rights are of little 
interest to marginal citizens.  T. H. Marshall’s narrative of the evolution of citizenship 
rights from civil, through political, to social rights to ‘share in a modicum of economic 
welfare and security [and] to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards 
prevailing in the society’ is a familiar one to sociologists (Marshall 1992: 8; Nash 2000: 
159-165).  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was actually developed at the 
high point of collectivism in the US and Europe and in negotiation with communist 
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USSR and China, and it contains many articles concerning social rights.  Article 22 of 
the UDHR, for example, which is just one of many that specify core welfare rights, 
states that everyone is entitled to the realisation ‘through national effort and 
international co-operation’ of their economic, social and cultural rights.   However, 
despite their common origins in the UDHR, the history of the legalisation of human 
rights has been very different in the case of economic and social rights from that of 
civil rights.   
 
Those who drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights achieved a remarkable 
compromise with the inclusion of the full range of civil, political and social rights that 
had been gained by citizens in the US and in Europe because by 1948 socialists and 
liberals were already engaged in bitter disputes over which should be ideologically and 
strategically prioritised (Forsythe 2000; Glendon 2001).  This dispute continued 
through the Cold War, and though the political labels of the protagonists may now have 
changed, it continues today.  One main aspect of the dispute over the validity of 
economic and social rights today is whether they can be legalised at all: it is hard to 
specify clear, detailed state obligations to meet social needs (especially where resources 
are lacking) in comparison with the specific obligations that must be made by specific 
agents to stop acting in certain ways that characterise civil rights (Donnelly 1989: 33-4; 
see also Dembour 2006).  Making states legally accountable for making the best use of 
their resources to meet social and economic rights is not just logically conceivable, 
however: it has even been put into practice.  Economic and social rights have been 
legalised in the South African constitution: the South African state has been called to 
account in its national courts for violations of the social and economic rights of people 
under its jurisdiction (Olivier and Jansen van Ransburg 2006).  In the wealthy states of 
 13
the global North, however, the term ‘human rights’ is still used almost exclusively to 
mean the civil rights covered by the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
and it is these rights that are increasingly binding on states through legalisation.   
 
Within Europe claims to economic and social human rights have been effective for 
some migrants within existing, deteriorating state regimes of welfare – as we shall see 
in the case of quasi-citizens below - but human rights language has not been 
developed to address issues of welfare more generally anywhere in the North.  There 
is, for example, no provision in the system of European human rights law for 
economic and social rights.  The European Social Charter of the Council of Europe is 
policy-oriented, relying on the supervision of practices through scrutiny of reports and 
complaints submitted to the European Committee of Social Rights, which may 
recommend that states should bring national law and practice into conformity with the 
Charter. It does not allow for adjudication in the European Court of Human Rights.  
Despite the apparent importance of economic and social human rights in terms of 
international agreements, then, they have not become cosmopolitan law in the same 
way as civil rights, and they do not provide protection for marginal citizens in the 
North.  Human rights appear, rather, to be irrelevant to the welfare of these citizens.  
 
The second way in which marginality is conferred on citizens is through racialised 
assumptions with regard to skin colour, ethnicity and religion.  It is this aspect that is 
especially to the fore with heightened security during the ‘war on terror’ in which civil 
rights on which there has long been international consensus are now being ignored by 
powerful and influential states.  A paradigm case here is that of Yasser Esam Hamdi 
who was imprisoned in the US without charge and without access to a lawyer for 
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several years on suspicion of terrorist activities after being picked up in Afghanistan.  It 
was at first believed that Hamdi, who was brought up in Saudi Arabia by his parents, 
both of whom are Saudi citizens, was not a US citizen.  But even when it was 
confirmed that he had US citizenship as a result of being born in Louisiana, he 
continued to be treated as an ‘enemy combatant’ by the Bush Administration and to be 
held under similar conditions to the non-citizens in Guantanamo Bay.  In 2004 Hamdi 
agreed to give up his US citizenship in return for deportation to Saudi Arabia (Nyer 
2006).  Hamdi’s case was taken up by human rights organisations, but in legal terms 
human rights were irrelevant in this case because, as noted above, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which lawyers could certainly have used to 
contest his arbitrary detention, is not incorporated into domestic law in the US.  Human 
rights organisations could only draw public attention to the Bush Administration’s 
violations of international human rights; in court they could use only US law.  In 
addition, however, Hamdi’s citizenship status, though not completely irrelevant (it did 
save him from the status of ‘un-citizen’, and from incarceration in Guantanamo), also 
proved to be of so little value to him that he was relatively easily persuaded to give it 
up.  Hamdi was never charged nor tried in a US court. (2)  
 
Although the specifics of these US cases are distinctive, the status of racialised 
‘marginal citizenship’ is by no means confined to the US.  A good European 
comparison with Hamdi’s case is that of French citizens awaiting charges in French 
prisons while suspicions of their involvement in terrorist activities are investigated – 
sometimes for years (Human Rights Watch Report 2008).  Whilst the procedures to 
investigate suspected criminal activities in France do not formally distinguish between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, or indeed between suspected terrorists and other suspected 
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criminals, there is no doubt that Muslims suspected of terrorism are far more likely to 
suffer the abuses for which the system has been criticised more generally.  Human 
rights are not irrelevant in the same way in such cases as they were in the Hamdi case: 
indeed, the French state has been regularly criticised for its criminal procedures by the 
European Court of Human Rights, including on grounds of torture (the only country 
other than Turkey to have such a finding against it by the court).  They are irrelevant, 
however, because the French government and judiciary have ignored proposals for 
reform of the system - even when they have come from a commission set up by the 
French state itself to investigate the legality of these procedures with respect to human 
rights law (Hodgson 2004: 189).  This disregard for human rights clearly opens up the 
possibility that some citizens, especially those suspected of the most serious crimes 
against the state, will be treated quite differently from others. 
 
Quasi-citizens 
Thirdly, there are ‘quasi-citizens’ who are in a different legal position from either super 
or marginal citizens.  Quasi-citizens are denizens, or long-term residents in a state who 
have access to employment and who have gained rights similar to citizens as a result of 
relatively secure employment, long-term residence and political mobilisation.  They 
have successfully organised politically to put pressure on states to recognise their 
human rights in order to gain access to education, health-care, housing and other 
welfare rights on the same basis as citizens, as well as cultural rights to translators in 
welfare services, some education for children in the language of their homeland and so 
on.  Quasi-citizens do not, however, have political rights to vote in the national 
elections of states in which they are resident, though in some cases they have rights to 
vote in local and European elections (Balibar 2004; Benhabib 2008).   
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 The category of quasi-citizens contains a diverse group of people.  In Europe it includes 
some EU citizens - those from less powerful states who are employed in unskilled work 
– and guest-workers who, often with their families, have sometimes been resident as 
non-nationals, and therefore as non-EU citizens too, for generations (Morris 2002).  In 
the US, it also includes settled communities of migrant workers who have won social 
rights to health-care, education for children, housing and other welfare rights though 
they have not naturalised as citizens.  They have won these rights under the US 
constitution rather than through human rights advocacy but, according to David 
Jacobson, social rights constitute a substantial material gain for non-citizens in the US 
(Jacobson 1996).  The category also includes political refugees who have been granted 
asylum as a result of international commitments signed and administered by states in 
accordance with human rights principles who may similarly be resident as non-
nationals for many years.   
 
Whilst, as Soysal (1994) has argued, what she calls ‘postnational citizenship’ has been 
an important advance for migrants in terms of institutionalising their human rights, the 
relative instability of their legal status (as they are ‘not-citizens’) and the dangers it 
creates for securing other fundamental human rights on which they may need to depend 
is becoming clearer.  A good example of the dangers of quasi-citizenship in this respect 
comes from the UK state’s treatment of political refugees who were arrested and 
detained without charge on suspicion of terrorist activities following 9/11.  The 
‘Belmarsh detainees’ were held for up to three years before the Law Lords, the highest 
court of appeal in the UK, found their imprisonment unlawful on the grounds of 
discrimination against non-citizens, a ruling based on the European Convention of 
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Human Rights.  However, in response to the Lords’ ruling, parliament passed the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2005 which granted the Executive the power to keep 
suspected terrorists under ‘control orders’ if the authorities had ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
about their activities based on secret evidence (which neither they nor their lawyers 
were allowed to see).  The Prevention of Terrorism Act put an end to discrimination 
against non-citizens by sanctioning the violation of the fundamental rights of citizens 
too: all are potentially equally subject to a range of punitive measures without ever 
having been charged with a crime or having had the chance to defend themselves in 
court.  Again it is clear from this example that, although the rule of law may be 
formally upheld in such legislation, some people are far more likely to be subject to 
punitive measures than others.  In this case it is those who have been granted refugee 
status (in order to safeguard their human rights) who then find themselves at risk of 
arbitrary detention (in violation of fundamental human rights) (see Nash 2009). 
 
Furthermore, as a result of the Law Lords ruling, the UK government went still further 
in attempting to deal with refugees they suspected of having connections with terrorists, 
proposing to send them back to their countries of origin on the proviso that the 
authorities there promised to guarantee their safety.  This is absolutely forbidden by the 
Convention Against Torture, incorporated into UK law in the Criminal Justice Act 
1988, and so far it has not been allowed by the UK’s highest court.  Similarly, the US 
also tried to deport a refugee, Sameh Khouzam, on the basis of ‘diplomatic assurances’ 
from Egypt that state agents would not torture or kill him if he were sent back.  It was 
not permitted by the US courts because the Convention Against Torture is one of the 
rare international human rights instruments that has been incorporated into US law, and 
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it forbids the government to transfer a person to a state where there are reasons to be 
believe they will be subjected to torture.   
 
What we see, then, in relation to the status of quasi-citizenship is that state action has 
been limited in conformity with human rights law in cases of arbitrary detention, torture 
and murder, both in Europe and the US.  The legalisation of human rights has 
effectively resulted in cosmopolitan law in such cases, equalising the legal status of 
citizens and non-citizens alike.  On the other hand, however, quasi-citizens find 
themselves in a position where, although their human rights are protected in some 
respects, they are at the same time threatened by the very states that protect them.   In 
terms of moral resources, their status is far less than that of full citizens and this affords 
them less protection than citizens.  What is as striking as the legal deconstruction of the 
distinction between citizens and non-citizens in these cases is the determination of the 
US and UK governments to violate the human rights of quasi-citizens in the name of 
national security.  It is clear that in the case of the legislation enabling the 
imprisonment of the ‘Belmarsh detainees’ the UK government made a political 
calculation that it would not be able to detain British citizens indefinitely without 
charge, even if those citizens potentially pose as great a security threat as non-citizens.  
The position of quasi-citizens is precarious because their status is secured only by 
human rights which, though they may be effective, eventually, in the legal domain, are 
insufficient to achieve the degree of respect to which citizens in general are supposed to 
be legitimately entitled.       
 
Sub-citizens 
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If quasi-citizens are in a precarious position with regard to their fundamental human 
rights, sub-citizens routinely face even greater difficulties.  Sub-citizens are those who 
do not have paid employment in the country in which they are resident, nor any 
entitlement to state benefits there.  In both Europe and the US this category includes 
those who are waiting to have asylum cases heard and who may be detained 
indefinitely in camps whilst that process is going on.  It also includes those considered 
to be adult dependants of quasi-citizens – wives and other family members - who have 
no independent right to residence and who are, therefore, potentially subject to violence 
and abuse within the home (without real possibility of redress), as well from their home 
states.   
 
Such legal status as ‘sub-citizens’ enjoy is literally created by international human 
rights law as it is administered through state-specific policies.  The status of refugees in 
the country in which they are detained or resident is based on international law 
concerning the human rights of refugees, derived from the 1951 UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, and on national regulations concerning the 
administration of that law.  Sub-citizens who are the dependants of quasi-citizens have 
virtually no legal status in international law as individuals, but only that which has been 
won through national political mobilisation, usually by women’s groups.  In the UK, 
for example, it was as a result of such campaigning that the government finally lifted 
the rule which meant that a wife could not leave a husband who abused her during their 
first year of residence without being immediately removed from the country – though 
the type of evidence of abuse that is admitted in these cases is still unacceptably 
restricted (‘Campaigns’ www.southallblacksisters.org.uk, consulted 27 November 
2007).    
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 Un-citizens 
Finally, even sub-citizens are in a better position than un-citizens.  This group includes 
undocumented migrants who have no recognised status in receiving countries and who 
may be detained in refugee camps or immediately deported if they are not permitted to 
apply for asylum, even if they have been living and working there for years.  It also 
now includes people detained in the ‘war on terror’ in newly created ‘non-places’ 
which are outside national territories and therefore somehow also outside the 
jurisdiction of sovereign states, whilst nevertheless being under their administration.  
 
The most famous example here is Guantanamo Bay, though there are also other such 
camps containing suspected terrorists in Bagram, Kandahar and elsewhere.  These un-
citizens are in a legal ‘black hole’ because of the special status they have been assigned 
as ‘illegal combatants’ and the extraordinary lengths to which the US executive has 
gone to deny them access to lawyers and to keep them out of US courts (Steyn 2004).  
This is not to say that Guantanamo Bay falls outside the law; on the contrary it is rather 
that in anticipation of, and in response to, legal challenges on the basis of international 
and US law the camp has been created precisely in the complex interstices of 
international and national law (Johns 2005; Nash 2009).   
 
Guantanamo Bay is the most visible symbol of the lack of human rights in the US.  
There is no legal recourse to international human rights which would cut through the 
legal obfuscations out of which it has been created, though politically it is human rights 
organisations that have been largely responsible for monitoring and publicising the 
situation of the detainees there.  They are also responsible for bringing cases to the US 
 21
courts using national law.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has twice now ruled that it is 
unconstitutional to deny the Guantanamo Bay detainees habeus corpus rights to 
challenge the legality of their detention in court.  In the first case, Rasul v. Bush 2004, 
the ruling was relatively weak, stating only that detainees have formal rights to 
procedures by which to challenge their detention.  It resulted in the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 in which detainees were granted access to military courts 
that fell well short of normal legal procedures.  The second ruling in 2008 was far 
stronger, stating that detainees must have recourse to civilian courts.  This has not yet 
resulted in action at the time of writing.  Though the closure of Guantanamo Bay is 
widely predicted, indeed it was one of the election promises of incoming US President 
Barak Obama, the fate of the remaining detainees is far from certain.   
 
‘Actually existing’ cosmopolitan citizenship 
Human rights law is supposed to equalise the status of citizens and non-citizens within 
and across states, at least along some significant dimensions.  In the case of civil rights, 
often called fundamental rights in the US and Europe, rights to equality before the law 
and to personal and political freedom are very well-established at the international level 
and in the rhetoric of state legitimation abroad and at home.  In the case of economic 
and social rights the requirements on states are far less clear – certainly neither the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights stipulates anything like formal equality between citizens or 
between citizens and non-citizens.  There is, however, a requirement on states to meet 
the basic needs of people under their jurisdiction, citizens or not, and to co-operate 
internationally to meet the basic needs of people in other states too.    
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What we see, however, as a result of the uneven application of human rights law 
combined with existing social and economic inequalities amongst citizens and non-
citizens, is a proliferation of statuses regarding citizenship and human rights rather than 
an equalisation of treatment for citizens and non-citizens.  ‘Actually existing’ 
cosmopolitanism involves the multiplication of differences which are also inequalities: 
packages of rights that are adapted to time and place, to the particular configurations of 
citizens and non-citizens who happen to find themselves living under a particular 
jurisdiction in particular political circumstances.  Politicians seek re-election rather than 
the protection of minority rights; judges are very rarely trained in human rights law 
(none of the judges involved in the Law Lords’ cases concerning the Belmarsh 
detainees, for example, is an expert on human rights); and the media tend to frame 
human rights concerns in terms of national interests (Nash 2009).  Under such 
circumstances it is extremely difficult to create the political will to secure the equality 
of citizens and non-citizens, cosmopolitan law is slow, extraordinarily complex and 
multi-layered, and – even where it can be used – difficult and politically controversial 
to apply.  Human rights for non-citizens are far from popular.  The result is that in 
practice there are quite different sets of rights for different persons of different status.    
 
Although there is no equalisation between citizens and non-citizens as a result of the 
cosmopolitanisation of human rights law, then, the proliferation of citizenship statuses 
in relation to human rights does result in a breakdown of the absolute distinction 
between citizen and non-citizen on which the nation-state was founded.  This is 
especially evident in Europe in comparison with the US, though to some extent it is 
happening there too, largely thanks to the activities of human rights organisations and 
despite the limited legal resources with which they have to work.  It is very important 
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not to idealise Europe in comparison with the US: racialised minorities continue to be 
very unpopular in both places, especially in the ongoing conditions of heightened 
national security, and this affects how human rights are interpreted and implemented 
even where human rights law is relatively well-established. 
 
Human rights play an ambiguous role in the new political regime.  On the one hand the 
way in which human rights are currently being interpreted in legal terms accommodates 
inequalities: human rights give little purchase on structures of social and economic 
inequity; and they are not easily articulated as part of an anti-racist strategy to address 
the targeting of some groups as so dangerous that their rights must be curtailed for the 
good of all.  Furthermore, the legalisation of human rights seems to make comparison 
across statuses difficult: even where the fundamental rights of non-citizens are 
respected, these groups do not enjoy the same legal and moral status as citizens.  In 
contrast the formal and substantive equality of national citizenship was an aspiration, 
even if it has never been close to full realisation.  On the other hand human rights are 
being used by organisations to frame and contest inequalities in the treatment of 
citizens and non-citizens as violating human rights.  In this respect human rights do 
function as an ideal to aspire to: the remedy for human rights abuses is more and better 
human rights law, better education for the judiciary and for politicians, more effective 
mobilisation by advocacy organisations, a more responsible media and so on.  The 
difficulty for us, caught up in what appears to be the dismantling of the ideal of the 
national state and the emergence of ‘actually existing’ cosmopolitanism, is how to 
assess the potential of human rights for justice.  Are human rights a progressive force, 
tending in the main to articulate clear ideals of cosmopolitan justice around which it is 
possible to mobilise to fight injustice?  Or have human rights themselves become part 
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of the problem, lending legitimacy to differences which are actually new forms of 
inequality and which may even solidify into opportunities for the state’s ill-treatment 
and abuse of individuals which human rights law was supposed to end? 
 
 
Notes 
1. This is especially, and notoriously, evident in the formulation of the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man.   
Article 1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions 
may be founded only upon the general good.  
Article 2. The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural 
and imprescriptible rights of man.  These rights are liberty, property, security, 
and resistance to oppression.  
Article 3. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation.  
 
We move very rapidly here from abstract statements of the universal rights of man, to 
an assertion of the sovereignty of the nation, which is empowered to make such social 
distinctions as are deemed necessary for the good of all.  The move from universal to 
particular is perhaps less obvious in the wording of the American Declaration of 
Independence, which begins: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’ What is important 
here is the ‘we’, which – though it is not specified - is that of the American nation.  
The American Declaration presupposes rather than explicitly states that it is 
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individuals who are members of the nation who are in possession of the universal 
rights of man. 
 
2. The comparable, if less dramatic, case is that of Jose Padilla, also a US citizen and 
also treated as an ‘enemy combatant’ by the Bush Administration.  It was only after 
several years in prison and as a result of pressure from civil liberties groups which took 
his case all the way to the Supreme Court, that Padilla was charged.  Tried in a civilian 
court, he was found guilty of criminal conspiracy and sentenced to 17 and a half years 
in jail.  
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